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Abstract
Bioterrorism literally means using microorganisms or infected samples to cause terror and panic in populations. Bioterrorism had already
started 14 centuries before Christ, when the Hittites sent infected rams to their enemies. However, apart from some rare well-documented
events, it is often very difﬁcult for historians and microbiologists to differentiate natural epidemics from alleged biological attacks, because:
(i) little information is available for times before the advent of modern microbiology; (ii) truth may be manipulated for political reasons,
especially for a hot topic such as a biological attack; and (iii) the passage of time may also have distorted the reality of the past. Nevertheless,
we have tried to provide to clinical microbiologists an overview of some likely biological warfare that occurred before the 18th century and
that included the intentional spread of epidemic diseases such as tularaemia, plague, malaria, smallpox, yellow fever, and leprosy. We also
summarize the main events that occurred during the modern microbiology era, from World War I to the recent ‘anthrax letters’ that
followed the World Trade Center attack of September 2001. Again, the political polemic surrounding the use of infectious agents as a
weapon may distort the truth. This is nicely exempliﬁed by the Sverdlovsk accident, which was initially attributed by the authorities to a
natural foodborne outbreak, and was ofﬁcially recognized as having a military cause only 13 years later.
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Introduction
The current deﬁnition of terrorism emphasizes that its main
objective is to threaten and terrorize large groups of humans,
governments, armies, or society as a whole. Thus, one may
assume, in the context of a historical analysis of bioterrorism,
that it involves the use of various biological agents by all kinds
of actors or groups, including political or military actors and
ofﬁcial states, motivated by different reasons (be they political,
religious, or other ideological objectives), in order to attain
such objectives. As expressed by a prominent expert on the
topic, the ‘transcendence of biological warfare—over medicine
and public health, private criminal acts, terrorism, interstate
warfare, and international law directed at the elimination of
biological warfare—makes this one of the most intricate topics
of discourses, poses very difﬁcult problems, and open some
novel challenges in the ethical domain. Biological warfare
events (BW) is widely regarded as the absolute perversion of
medical science’ [1]. As well as this being perfectly true with
regard to contemporary political and scientiﬁc concerns, the
claim of the transcendence of biological warfare (BW) and
bioterrorism also has historical pertinence, insofar as the fact
of threatening one’s neighbours’ health by using biological
technologies seems to be as old as humanity itself. However,
the historical study of BW and bioterrorism is made extremely
difﬁcult, and any conclusions in this respect must be drawn
with caution, because of several concomitant factors: ﬁrst, the
lack of reliable scientiﬁc data regarding alleged bioterrorist
attacks, especially before the advent of modern microbiology;
second, the polemical conditions surrounding any alleged
biological attack, within which the available documents become
susceptible to multiple political manipulations, and thus difﬁcult
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to interpret objectively; and third, the historical distance of
ancient stories about biological attacks, and the possible
misunderstanding of them if they are read with contemporary
lenses [2]. Given such factors, it is easy to understand why it
may become difﬁcult for historians to differentiate natural
epidemics from alleged biological attacks.
From an epistemological perspective, the advent of modern
microbiology at the end of the 19th century undoubtedly
marks the major turning point in the scientiﬁc history of BW
long after its beginnings in remote antiquity. Thus, Louis
Pasteur’s and Robert Koch’s advances in the theoretical
understanding of microbiology, and the derived practical
microbiological methods, suddenly offered scientists the
possibility of systematically isolating and producing a huge
number of speciﬁc pathogens, as well as, in the majority of
cases, controlling their dissemination. From a socio-political
perspective, however, one might consider other turning
points: the major world conﬂicts of the 20th century
constitute, in this respect, the main events that turned BW
from a sporadic, if dangerous, mass weapon, to an almost
standard, if not constantly used, weapon, in brief a classic tool
of most of modern armies. From that period on, modern
states felt compelled to mutually negotiate and agree on
international regulations in order to try to master the threat of
biological (as well as chemical) weapons. A crucial step in the
history of BW and bioterrorism occurred after World War II,
when small groups of activists acquired the ability to master
the technologies involved in BW, and were suddenly able to
threaten not only individuals but huge amounts of people, thus
adding to the threat of the states’ armies the more
uncontrollable one of single individuals or small groups, and
thus representing a major concern for state security.
Use of BiologicalWeapons During Antiquities,
Middle Ages and Colonial Period
Contagious diseases and other biological weapons were
recognized for their potential impact on armies or people as
early as the 14th century BC (Table 1). The Hittites might have
produced the ﬁrst documented example of BW by sending
diseased rams (possibly infected with tularaemia) to their
enemies to weaken them [3]. In the fourth century BC, the
Greek historian Herodotus relates that Scythian archers used
to infect their arrows by dipping them in a mixture of
decomposing cadavers of adders and human blood. According
to our modern interpretation, this mixture might have
contained Clostridium perfringens and Clostridium tetani, as well
as the snakes’ venom [4]. In the third century BC, the military
commander Hannibal of Cartagena set ﬁre to the enemy’s ﬂeet
(belonging to King Eumenes II of Pergamon) with pots full of
venomous snakes. Similar examples are reported by historians
or, for cases closer to our epoch, by anthropologists of the use
of arrows or other vessels infected with different products
extracted from animal parts or plants in order to attack the
human enemy [5,6]. Similarly, the use of arrows for the
transmission of plague is suggested by some allegoric docu-
ments, such as the drawing painted in 1437 by an anonymous
artist on a wood cover used by the government of Siena to
protect ofﬁcial documents (Fig. 1). In the Middle Ages, a
famous although controversial example is offered by the siege
of Caffa (now Feodossia in Ukraine/Crimea), a Genovese
outpost on the Black Sea coast, by the Mongols. In 1346, the
attacking army experienced an epidemic of bubonic plague.
The Italian chronicler Gabriele de’ Mussi, in his Istoria de Morbo
sive Mortalitate quae fuit Anno Domini 1348, describes quite
plausibly how the plague was transmitted by the Mongols by
throwing diseased cadavers with catapults into the besieged
city, and how ships transporting Genovese soldiers, ﬂeas and
rats ﬂeeing from there brought it to the Mediterranean ports.
Given the highly complex epidemiology of plague, this inter-
pretation of the Black Death (which might have killed
>25 million people in the following years throughout Europe)
as stemming from a speciﬁc and localized origin of the Black
Death remains controversial. Similarly, it remains doubtful
whether the effect of throwing infected cadavers could have
been the sole cause of the outburst of an epidemic in the
besieged city. However, this episode of the use of cadavers in
order to infect a population remains a landmark in the history
of BW [7–9]. Similar examples of the use of the technique of
catapulting infected cadavers can be found throughout the
TABLE 1. Examples of biological warfare before the micro-
biology era [13])
Year Event
14th century BC The Hittites send rams infected with tularaemia to their
enemies
4th century BC According to Herodotus, Scythian archers infect their
arrows by dipping them into decomposing cadavers
1155 Barbarossa poisons water wells with human bodies,
Tortona (Italy)
1346 Mongols hurl bodies of plague victims over the walls of the
besieged city of Caffa (Crimea)
1422 Lithuanian army hurls manure made of infected victims
into the town of Carolstein (Bohemia)
1495 Spanish mix wine with blood of leprosy patients to sell to
their French foes, Naples (Italy)
1650 Polish army ﬁres saliva from rabid dogs towards their
enemies
1710 Russian army catapult plague cadavers over the Swedish
troops in Reval (Estonia)
1763 British ofﬁcers distribute blankets from smallpox hospital
to Native Americans
1797 The Napoleonic armies ﬂood the plains
around Mantua (Italy), to enhance the spread of malaria
among the enemy
1863 Confederates sell clothing from yellow fever and smallpox
patients to Union troops during the American Civil War
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modern period, from the siege of the Bohemian city of
Carolstein by Lithuanian troops in 1422 to the siege of the
Swedish army in Reval (Estonia) in 1710 by the Russians
[10–13].
During the subsequent centuries, smallpox represented the
most effective, if purposefully used, biological weapon of
Occidental war and colonial history. Introduced in the
American continent by the European colonizers, it was
explicitly used several times as a way to infect Native
Americans during the so-called ‘Conquest of the West’. To
quote but only one anecdote, Captain Ecuyer, of the British
forces, after offering blankets from a smallpox hospital to
Native Americans, noted in his journal: ‘I hope it will have the
desired effect’ [2]. However, in the light of contemporary
knowledge, it remains doubtful whether his hopes were
fulﬁlled, given the fact that the transmission of smallpox
through this kind of vector is much less efﬁcient than
respiratory transmission, and that Native Americans had been
in contact with smallpox >200 years before Ecuyer’s trickery,
notably during Pizarro’s conquest of South America in the 16th
century. As a whole, the analysis of the various ‘pre-micro-
biological” attempts at BW illustrate the difﬁculty of differen-
tiating attempted biological attack from naturally occurring
epidemics [2].
Biological Warfare: A Classic Tool of Armies
During the Modern Era
The truly modern era of BW starts with the foundation of
microbiology at the end of the 19th century by Louis Pasteur,
Robert Koch, and their followers. By identifying and control-
ling, in a rational and systematic way, many agents of human
and animal disease, they gave scientists the possibility of
systematically isolating and producing speciﬁc pathogens on a
large scale, as well as, in a majority of cases, at least
theoretically, controlling their dissemination. Until a few
decades after being established, the new scientiﬁc paradigm
does not seem to have been used as a new way to threaten or
terrorize groups of human. Evidence has been produced that
nations involved in World War I, especially Germany, but also
France on a more limited scale, developed secret BW
programmes, such as the infection of animal feed with Bacillus
anthracis or Burkholderia mallei in order to infect the enemy
[10,14]. Whatever the effectiveness of these programmes
might have been, the threat of BW (Table 2), combined with
the horror of chemical warfare being used on the battleﬁeld,
became, for the ﬁrst time in history, a major political concern
at the international level. As a consequence, the Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
FIG. 1. Allegory of the plague: Biccherna, a wood cover (used to
protect ofﬁcial documents of the civic government of Siena), painted
around 1437 by an anonymous artist (possibly Giovanni di Paolo). This
allegory is considered to be a representation of the plague and its high
contagiousness, and suggests that, in addition to the catapulting of
cadavers into besieged cities, plague may also be transmitted by using
inoculated arrows. Copyright: ©bpk/Kunstgewerbemuseum, SMB/
Saturia Linke.
TABLE 2. Crucial biological agents as deﬁned by the CDC,
and likely use as biological weapons [13]
Disease Pathogen Useda
Category A (major public health hazards)
Anthrax Bacillus anthracis World War I; World War II;
Soviet Union, 1979; Japan,
1995; USA, 2001
Botulism Clostridium
botulinumb
–
Haemorrhagic
fever
Marburg virus Soviet bioweapons programme
Ebola virus –
Arenaviruses –
Plague Yersinia pestis Fourteenth-century Europe;
World War II
Smallpox Variola major Eighteenth-century North
America
Tularaemia Francisella tularensis World War II
Category B (public health hazards)
Brucellosis Brucella –
Cholera Vibrio cholerae World War II
Encephalitis Alphaviruses World War II
Food poisoning Salmonella species,
Shigella species
World War II; USA, 1990s
Glanders Burkholderia mallei World War I; World War II
Psittacosis Chlamydia psittaci –
Q-fever Coxiella burnetti –
Typhus Rickettsia prowazekii World War II
Various toxic
syndromes
Various bacteria World War II
Only a selected number of examples are provided in this table. Please note that
Category C agents are not listed. Category C agents include emerging pathogens
and pathogens that are made more pathogenic by genetic engineering. Category C
agents include, for example, hantavirus, Nipah virus, tick-borne encephalitis virus,
haemorrhagic fever viruses, yellow fever virus, and multidrug-resistant bacteria.
aDoes not include time and place of production, but only indicates where agents
were applied and probably resulted in casualties, and were used in war, in
research, or as terror agents.
bIn that case, only the toxin would be used.
ª2014 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2014 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20, 497–502
CMI Barras et al. History of biological warfare and bioterrorism 499
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare was ratiﬁed in 1925, and prohibited the use of
biological weapons, but not their research and production.
Thus, states that had ratiﬁed the Geneva Protocol, such as
France, the UK, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Poland, and the Soviet
Union, began research on biological weapons; so did the USA,
which did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1975 [2].
During the interwar period, the Japanese government began
to develop one of the most systematic and ambitious BW
programmes known to date. The famous Unit 731 (whose
ofﬁcial name was the Army Epidemic Prevention Research
Laboratory) was set up in 1932 (Fig. 2). Inspired by the
German use of gases during the World War I, Japanese
scientists subjected prisoners to different kinds of experimen-
tation, including vivisection, weapons tests, and germ warfare
attacks. Human subjects were inoculated with organisms
causing cholera, smallpox, botulism, bubonic plague, anthrax,
tularaemia, and various venereal diseases, and then left
untreated, in order to study the various effects of the diseases.
The research of Unit 731 led the Japanese army to conduct
large-scale trials of biological weapons, such as the develop-
ment of bombs used to spread pathogens, the infection of
reservoirs and wells with deadly pathogens (notably B. anthra-
cis, Vibrio cholerae, Yersina pestis, Shigella species, and Salmonella
species), and the dropping of plague-infected ﬂeas, infected
food and clothing by aircraft into areas of China that were not
occupied by Japanese soldiers. It is now estimated that several
thousands of people (including several Japanese soldiers,
victims of the difﬁculty of strictly controlling the dissemination
of biological weapons) died as the result of these attacks
[15–17]. The Japanese army was also accused of using BW
against the Soviet Union and Mongolia [17].
The Nazis performed some research on the effects of
various vaccinations and drugs on prisoners infected with
Rickettsia prowazekii, hepatitis A virus, or Plasmodium species,
but they apparently never considered using biological weapons
during Word War II. In contrast, the USA was pushed to
perform BW research by their allies, who feared that the
Germans might attack with biological weapons [2,18,19]. In
1942, the US War Research Service was created to set up a
BW programme. This included the creation of a laboratory
research facility in Maryland (later renamed Fort Detrick), and
various production facilities and testing places elsewhere in the
country. After the end of World War II, the US government
granted immunity against prosecution for war crimes to the
Japanese Unit 731 leaders in exchange for the knowledge
gained through their experiments. Many similarities can,
indeed, be found between the scientiﬁc research interests of
Unit 731 and the US BW programme, including the types of
biological agent studied, and the use of simulations, such as
tests using non-lethal forms of bacteria in order to test their
dispersion properties as weapons. Samples from these tests
were then collected by Soviet spies, and helped the Soviet
Union to further develop its own biological weapons
programme [19].
Typically for the Cold War era, many (mostly unsubstanti-
ated) allegations of BW attacks were made between the 1950s
and 1980s, in the context of the Korean and Vietnam wars, the
Afghanistan invasion, and the Kampuchea dictatorship. How-
ever, they were never witnessed, nor were samples of the
alleged products used found. They are now regarded as resulting
from the ferocious propaganda arising from both sides.
In parallel with this aggressive development of BW
programmes and counter-propaganda, there was an increasing
concern among the nations regarding the epidemiological risks
and the ineffectiveness of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Under
pressure from the WHO, the new Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (better
known under the abbreviation BWC) was signed in 1972 by
the US, UK and Soviet governments, as well as by >100 other
nations. Entering into force in March 1975, and having been
continuously reviewed since, it prohibits: (i) the possession of
biological agents except for ‘prophylactic, protective, or other
peaceful purposes’; (ii) the development of technologies
intended for the dispersal of biological agents for offensive
military purposes; and (iii) the destruction of existing stocks
[20].
However, the existence of the BWC did not prevent
various states from developing BW research programmes
FIG. 2. View of the Unit 731 complex at Pingfan, China. Copyright:
Despite all our efforts, we have not succeeded in identifying the
authors and rights holders for this widely disseminated image. If you
believe that you may be a rights holder, we invite you to contact Wiley,
the publisher of this Journal.
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(with the notable difﬁculty of deﬁning precisely what the limits
of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ are in this context). In fact, Iraq,
under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, initiated a BW
programme that included research on B. anthracis and various
viruses, but these potential weapons were not used during the
Gulf War. Some accidents resulting from manipulation also
occurred during the same period. One of the most discussed
examples is the case of the town of Sverdlovsk (now
Ekatarinburg, Russia), which became famous in April 1979
after the outbreak of an epidemic of anthrax. Western
specialists thought that Soviet workers, while transferring
huge amounts of anthrax bacteria (they were said to be large
enough to destroy the world’s population) into containers, let
some potentially deadly spores contaminate the environment.
The epidemic of anthrax occurred within a distance of 4 km
around the suspected BW research laboratory. However, the
Soviet ofﬁcials attributed it to unintentional consumption of
contaminated meat, and it was only in 1992 that President
Boris Yelstin admitted ofﬁcially that ‘our military developments
were the cause’ [2,21,22].
Bioterrorism during the Contemporary
Period
Among the main concerns during the contemporary period is
undoubtedly the possibility of the use of biological weapons in
the context of bioterrorism in a strict sense, i.e. the use of
biological weapons by non-state-sponsored individuals or
groups. From the 1980s on, one striking example is offered by
the Rajneesh cult, a religious group who, in 1984, intentionally
contaminated salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium in various
restaurants in Dalles, Oregon. This attack, which resulted in 751
cases, 45 of whom had to be hospitalized, seems to be one of the
very few conﬁrmed instances of biological terrorism after
WorldWar II, with a few exceptions such as the ‘anthrax letters
case’ [19]. Another religious cult, known as Aum Shinrikyo,
besides launching its famous attack with sarin gas in the Tokyo
metro in March 1995, was also developing, during the same
period, a programme on rudimentary biological weapons
containing Clostridium botulinum and B. anthracis, but with no
proof of effectiveness.
The case of the ‘anthrax letters’ in the aftermath of the
World Trade Center attack of 9 September 2001 in New York
represents one of the latest examples of bioterrorism, with a
huge impact at a psychological and political level as compared
with the small number of effective infections. Several letters
were sent during the autumn to government ofﬁcials or
journalists. Overall, 22 people were infected with anthrax, and
ﬁve of them died from anthrax or complications resulting from
it. The particular strain used was traced to the US army’s
laboratory at Fort Detrick, but the perpetrators of the attacks
remain unknown. This example shows that BW remains a
threat in the public sphere that has to be taken seriously and
responded to without overreaction at the both individual and
political levels. It also shows the importance of an adequate
level of preparedness of clinical microbiologists to identify
agents of BW [23].
Conclusions
Despite the advances in scientiﬁc research on bacteriology and,
more generally, in biology and medicine, deﬁnitive conclusions
regarding the effective use of biological attacks in the history of
humankind remain difﬁcult to draw, even since the advent of
state-sponsored programmes of BW: the lack of microbiological
and epidemiological data, the weight of political propaganda and
issues about military secrecy make the problem particularly
difﬁcult to solve for the historical researcher. However, the
recurring use of biological weapons (be it speculative or real),
which emerged long before the scientiﬁc revolution of micro-
biology at the end of the 19th century, is a striking characteristic
of that history. BW, as a ‘common aspect of the human
behavioural repertoire’ [24], is not a thing of the past, and
remains a serious concern, at a local level and at a global level,
notably in the light of the recent rise in the use (or possible use)
of non-state-sponsored BW. The question remains open of
whether, in the period in which we live, we have become more
humane than our predecessors concerning BW, and what are
the best ways of preventing similar threats in the future. In the
ﬁnal analysis, what the history of BW and bioterrorism suggests
is that the most effective prevention measure rests on the
creation and preservation of strong cultural norms at the
individual, social and political levels that prohibit the develop-
ment and use of such weapons. More broadly, although the
problem of BW is undoubtedly important, it should not cause us
to overreact, and obfuscate the reality of real and important
preventable infections.
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